Although it is not always acknowledged, the writing of history can often be a tool of official propaganda rather than simply an honest record of the truth. The exigencies of the two-nation theory and the ideological pressures required to preserve Pakistan as a foil to "Hindu-dominated" India have led to a considerable degree of obfuscation in history-writing in Pakistan. Whereas in Northern India, Mahmud of Ghazni (Ghaznavi) and Muhammad of Ghur (Ghauri) are widely seen as rapacious marauders, in Pakistan's ruling circles, both are seen as great warriors for an Islamic Jehad who founded highly cultured and justly administered kingdoms.
Yet, a careful perusal of the surviving record appears to indicate a picture that is far more complicated and far less flattering than implied by the court chroniclers of Ghouri and Ghaznavi (or by their present-day admirers). Just as official histories of the invasion of Sindh have been unduly romanticized (and sanitized so as to exclude uncomfortable facts and analysis), so too have been the conquests of Punjab by the Central Asian Turks.
While there is no doubt that both Ghouri and Ghaznavi possessed remarkable military skills and intellect, and fought with great shrewdness, persistence and tenacity, their achievements in other domains are somewhat more questionable. And the price of their military victories is not to be so easily dismissed. It is especially important to note that the impact of their military campaigns was felt very differently by different sections of the North Indian population.
First, it should be noted that there is considerable variance of opinion as to the motives of Ghouri and Ghaznavi as they attempted to overrun Northern India from their Turkic capitals in what is now Afghanistan. Whereas Utbi, Ghaznavi's court historian looked upon his military expeditions as "holy wars" for the 'extirpation of idolatry' and 'propagation of Islam', it is curious that even Multan (which had already come under Islamic influence) was not spared, and was also repeatedly attacked. If religious fervor were indeed a primary motive for the attacks, then it must be stated that the issue was more the assertion of Sunnism over the Shia and Ismaeli currents that had come to prevail in early 11th C Multan and Sindh. In any case, Indian historians such as Mohammad Habib are inclined to discount the 'Jehadi' dimension, and see economic and political factors to be of greater significance.
Just prior to the invasion of Mahmud of Ghazni, all of the Kabul valley, the Peshawar region and Punjab were united in the Hindushahi kingdom of Jaipal, which for two centuries had successfully resisted onslaughts from the West. As one of the best irrigated regions near Ghazni, Punjab offered not only a rich source of grain for any expansionist army, it also provided an enormous tax base that could then be used to sustain any kingdom that could successfully bring it under its sway. The Kabul valley and the mountain passes leading to the Punjab plains were naturally of great strategic importance, as were the Punjab plains for anyone harboring ambitions of reaching the fabulously wealthy cities of Mathura and Kannauj situated in the Yamuna-Ganga Doaba. The large-scale looting and vandalism of idols made of gold and silver (that were inlaid with precious stones) that followed the defeat of such important political, cultural and religious centers lends credence to views that grabbing a share of India's then fabled wealth was indeed an important motive-force for the campaigns of Ghaznavi.
Chroniclers at the court of Ghazni bemoaned how the "Hindus" were completely uninterested in the ideas and cultural artifacts of kingdoms they saw as alien, and how they were mostly self-absorbed and self-content. It is likely that ambitious scholars in Ghazni who may have sought or coveted the sponsorship of the Hindu courts may have been frustrated or even jealous that they could not establish a foothold in Kabul and Lahore, and may have therefore supported the military campaigns against Punjab.
It should also be noted that the Central Asian Turkik tribes who had conquered power all along the silk route were greatly dependant on income from trade for their economic survival. It is likely that having had difficulty selling Chinese, Persian or Central Asian wares in Punjab, they may have also had a vested interest in the defeat of the Jaipal dynasty. Since the towns along the silk route were relatively sparsely populated, there was also the constant demand for skilled artisans and slave labor at construction sites. Only the relatively densely populated settlements of the Indian plains could have provided skilled (or unskilled) slave labor in any quantity. (For instance, it is rarely mentioned that the Ghurids were slave-traders, and that the conquest of Punjab opened up a huge supply of slaves from Northern India). While the motives of the orthodox clerics in defending Islamic expansionism are only too evident, it is more than likely that a compendium of interests may have come together to propel the military advances of Ghazni (and later Ghouri) into Northern India.
For the court at Ghazni, the pirate-like attacks on India and the conquest of Punjab came as a huge boon, and Ghazni flourished as an important cultural center during Mahmud's reign. However, it cannot be denied that Ghazni's rise must have come at a considerable price. Even as one might argue that the gold and silver invested in temple idols was simply unproductive wealth and its theft ought not be invested with too much negative import, the slaughter (or enslavement) of hundreds of thousands of peasants and artisans is harder to ignore. The persecution of non-Sunnis and the enforcement of Sunni overlordship must also be acknowledged.
Although there are indications that Hindu society in the 11th century was developing some conservative and even reactionary trends, it is difficult to see how the Central Asian conquests could have helped matters. Contrary to the assertion of some historians (that Hindu society was entirely corrupt and fragmented) , Hindu rulers such as Jaipal did manage to garner the assistance of other friendly Rajputs, and even the support of the Shia rulers of Multan and Sindh. However, many of Punjab's masses initially remained aloof from the battles, assuming that their lot was not going to change one way or another. Certainly those that suffered the worst of caste-prejudices had little at stake.
But as it became clear that the defeat of West Punjab was going to lead to the veritable destruction of society and mass enslavement, the masses of Eastern Punjab got wiser, and the resistance to further invasions became much more determined.
As Punjab became the primary supplier of slaves to Central Asia, there was a wave of artisans and intellectuals who felt compelled to flee.For instance, there are plausible theories (on account of similarities in language, beliefs and customs) that suggest that the Roma people reached Europe upon fleeing persecution in Punjab and Sindh.
Al-Beruni, Mahmud's chronicler wrote: "Mahmud utterly ruined the prosperity of the country and performed those wonderful exploits by which the Hindus became like atoms of dust scattered in all directions...their scattered remains cherish, of course, the most inveterate aversion towards all Muslims. This is the reason too why Hindu sciences have retired far away from parts of the country conquered by us and have fled to places, which our hand cannot yet reach, to Kashmir, Benaras and other places."
The latter quote is especially important, because it suggests that prior to the Turkic conquest of Punjab, (and the imposition of Islamic rule), Hindu society provided scope for the study of science, but for such efforts to continue, scientifically-minded Hindus had to retreat further and further from the lands that were under attack.
With the exception of a small number of Hindus who saw upward mobility after volunteering their services to the armies of Ghaznavi and Ghauri (either as soldiers or as spies), the vast majority were left with no choice but to either convert to Islam or to be relegated to inferior social and political status and higher levels of taxation (if they chose to remain as Hindus). Moreover, even those that chose to convert to Islam were subject to systematic discrimination since the Turkish nobility refused to accept Indian converts to Islam as their equals. India's Turkish invaders thus became like a caste above all castes. Rather than the caste system being undermined by Islamic egalitarianism (as some have attempted to argue), new all-powerful castes of foreign-origin Muslims lorded over all others. The arrival of Islam merely cast a veil over overt caste-distinctions and prejudice, since by and large, upper-caste Hindu converts to Islam retained old caste loyalties even after conversion. Only in some cases were caste distinctions actually ameliorated (due to the succesful intervention of the Sufis), but this also occurred under the influence of some of the Vaishanava and Bhakti movements in Hindu India.
(Although over time, inter-marriage and the rise and fall of dynasties led to a certain degree of equalization amongst foreign-origin Muslims and Indian Muslim converts (as also between Hindus and Muslims), it is noteworthy that foreign-born Muslims (typically Ashrafs) retained some degree of aloofness from other Indian Muslims, and were amongst the chief supporters of the Muslim League, and were most instrumental in the formation of Pakistan. It is therefore not surprising that a version of history that suits this segment of the Muslim population has been foisted on all the people of Pakistan.)
In addition, the Ghaznavi and Ghauri invasions may have only served to de-politicize the Punjabi masses who became more introverted and many may have converted to Islam more out of expediency than any real conviction. It should also be noted that as per the notes of chroniclers such as Al-Beruni, Punjabi society had a somewhat liberal and detached attitude towards religion, and Al-Beruni was surprised to find the absence of the sort of messianic zeal he had observed amongst his Central Asian religious brethren. He also found the degree to which Punjabi men consulted their wives on virtually all important matters unusual - expecting the men to take decisions more unilaterally - perhaps in consultation with other men (as was customary amongst the Central Asian Turks), but not with their spouses. It is therefore likely that these invasions led to significant sociological changes that in particular reduced the space for spiritual and philosophical enquiry and further circumscribed the role of women in society.
It may be worth emphasizing that prior to the Islamic invasions the rules of warfare between warring Kshatriyas were such that civilian populations were not to be violated. There was no sanction for mass slavery or the mass rape of women. However, in the slave-owning and slave-trading culture of the Central Asian invaders, it was routine for civilians to be violated, to be raped and/or enslaved. As a consequence, this must have led to a considerable reduction in the freedom and the rights of women and children, who could no longer travel freely or risk being seen in public alone and unattended.
Unsurprisingly, Ghazni's rise was itself short-lived and the city was ransacked a decade after Mahmud's death by the ruler of Ghur (whose clan had a history of trading in slaves). Thus, Ghazni suffered the same fate that had been meted out earlier on cities such as Kannauj and Mathura. By and large, the Turkic Islamic empires in Punjab and Northern India were extremely unstable. It was much easier for the invaders to launch raids against the Hindu kingdoms that adjoined Punjab than successfully govern any territories they won. It is also notable that the fall of Western Punjab led to more organized resistance further East in the Doaba. Jaipal's son Anandapala not only received support from the wealthy, but also from weavers and other artisans. But in the end, the persistence of the invaders prevailed over the armies of Raja Anandapala.
Chronicles from the Sultanate period in Punjab and Delhi point to an era of constant court intrigues, conspiracies, murders of kings and wars of succession. Punjab - which was at the very front lines of the invasions was naturally most vulnerable, and its flat plains offered few geographical features that could have facilitated guerilla-wars against unpopular alien rule. But the Rajputana region, the hills East of Punjab and the Central Plateaus regions were always strongly contested, and were much harder to retain by any invader. Later, Yadav, Sikh and Jat chieftains began to offer militant resistance even in the plains. This to some degree explains the marked difference in the extent of Islamic penetration in the Indian subcontinent.
In any case, what is apparent is that at least during the earliest centuries of Turkic Islamic conquest, Punjab experienced a phase of considerable political instability, and may have suffered through a period of economic and cultural decline, perhaps, considerable stress and anxiety (if not outright abuse and oppression). At best, some sections of society may have survived by adapting to the demands of the invaders.
By and large, Punjab's cultural revival took place much later, under the influence of indigenous Sufi philosophers and artisans who were instrumental in the creation of a new architectural idiom and had a strong influence in the growth of the crafts industries. Multan was at the very heart of this Sufi-oriented tradition (until the rise of the Mughals, when Lahore gained in prominence).
But even any indirectly positive legacy must be weighed against the onerous and dramatic rise in the export of slaves from Punjab. For although the subjugation of Punjab may have facilitated the rapid growth of magnificent trading cities and political centers along the silk route (such as Khiva, Samarqand, Bukhara in Central Asia, and Herat and other great cities in what is now Afghanistan), underlying the medieval glamor and glory of the silk route was the plunder of Northern India's agricultural prosperity, and the significant enslavement of its peasant masses.
It is therefore ironic that the land which may have paid quite a heavy price for the invasions emanating from Ghazni and Ghur should today be ruled by a military elite that enjoins its people to revere these invaders as ideological heroes. And thus persists, the ideological enslavement to an externally-coerced medieval outlook. The all-round progress of the people of Punjab is held back., even as other nations prosper and develop at a much faster pace.
Yet, a careful perusal of the surviving record appears to indicate a picture that is far more complicated and far less flattering than implied by the court chroniclers of Ghouri and Ghaznavi (or by their present-day admirers). Just as official histories of the invasion of Sindh have been unduly romanticized (and sanitized so as to exclude uncomfortable facts and analysis), so too have been the conquests of Punjab by the Central Asian Turks.
While there is no doubt that both Ghouri and Ghaznavi possessed remarkable military skills and intellect, and fought with great shrewdness, persistence and tenacity, their achievements in other domains are somewhat more questionable. And the price of their military victories is not to be so easily dismissed. It is especially important to note that the impact of their military campaigns was felt very differently by different sections of the North Indian population.
First, it should be noted that there is considerable variance of opinion as to the motives of Ghouri and Ghaznavi as they attempted to overrun Northern India from their Turkic capitals in what is now Afghanistan. Whereas Utbi, Ghaznavi's court historian looked upon his military expeditions as "holy wars" for the 'extirpation of idolatry' and 'propagation of Islam', it is curious that even Multan (which had already come under Islamic influence) was not spared, and was also repeatedly attacked. If religious fervor were indeed a primary motive for the attacks, then it must be stated that the issue was more the assertion of Sunnism over the Shia and Ismaeli currents that had come to prevail in early 11th C Multan and Sindh. In any case, Indian historians such as Mohammad Habib are inclined to discount the 'Jehadi' dimension, and see economic and political factors to be of greater significance.
Just prior to the invasion of Mahmud of Ghazni, all of the Kabul valley, the Peshawar region and Punjab were united in the Hindushahi kingdom of Jaipal, which for two centuries had successfully resisted onslaughts from the West. As one of the best irrigated regions near Ghazni, Punjab offered not only a rich source of grain for any expansionist army, it also provided an enormous tax base that could then be used to sustain any kingdom that could successfully bring it under its sway. The Kabul valley and the mountain passes leading to the Punjab plains were naturally of great strategic importance, as were the Punjab plains for anyone harboring ambitions of reaching the fabulously wealthy cities of Mathura and Kannauj situated in the Yamuna-Ganga Doaba. The large-scale looting and vandalism of idols made of gold and silver (that were inlaid with precious stones) that followed the defeat of such important political, cultural and religious centers lends credence to views that grabbing a share of India's then fabled wealth was indeed an important motive-force for the campaigns of Ghaznavi.
Chroniclers at the court of Ghazni bemoaned how the "Hindus" were completely uninterested in the ideas and cultural artifacts of kingdoms they saw as alien, and how they were mostly self-absorbed and self-content. It is likely that ambitious scholars in Ghazni who may have sought or coveted the sponsorship of the Hindu courts may have been frustrated or even jealous that they could not establish a foothold in Kabul and Lahore, and may have therefore supported the military campaigns against Punjab.
It should also be noted that the Central Asian Turkik tribes who had conquered power all along the silk route were greatly dependant on income from trade for their economic survival. It is likely that having had difficulty selling Chinese, Persian or Central Asian wares in Punjab, they may have also had a vested interest in the defeat of the Jaipal dynasty. Since the towns along the silk route were relatively sparsely populated, there was also the constant demand for skilled artisans and slave labor at construction sites. Only the relatively densely populated settlements of the Indian plains could have provided skilled (or unskilled) slave labor in any quantity. (For instance, it is rarely mentioned that the Ghurids were slave-traders, and that the conquest of Punjab opened up a huge supply of slaves from Northern India). While the motives of the orthodox clerics in defending Islamic expansionism are only too evident, it is more than likely that a compendium of interests may have come together to propel the military advances of Ghazni (and later Ghouri) into Northern India.
For the court at Ghazni, the pirate-like attacks on India and the conquest of Punjab came as a huge boon, and Ghazni flourished as an important cultural center during Mahmud's reign. However, it cannot be denied that Ghazni's rise must have come at a considerable price. Even as one might argue that the gold and silver invested in temple idols was simply unproductive wealth and its theft ought not be invested with too much negative import, the slaughter (or enslavement) of hundreds of thousands of peasants and artisans is harder to ignore. The persecution of non-Sunnis and the enforcement of Sunni overlordship must also be acknowledged.
Although there are indications that Hindu society in the 11th century was developing some conservative and even reactionary trends, it is difficult to see how the Central Asian conquests could have helped matters. Contrary to the assertion of some historians (that Hindu society was entirely corrupt and fragmented) , Hindu rulers such as Jaipal did manage to garner the assistance of other friendly Rajputs, and even the support of the Shia rulers of Multan and Sindh. However, many of Punjab's masses initially remained aloof from the battles, assuming that their lot was not going to change one way or another. Certainly those that suffered the worst of caste-prejudices had little at stake.
But as it became clear that the defeat of West Punjab was going to lead to the veritable destruction of society and mass enslavement, the masses of Eastern Punjab got wiser, and the resistance to further invasions became much more determined.
As Punjab became the primary supplier of slaves to Central Asia, there was a wave of artisans and intellectuals who felt compelled to flee.For instance, there are plausible theories (on account of similarities in language, beliefs and customs) that suggest that the Roma people reached Europe upon fleeing persecution in Punjab and Sindh.
Al-Beruni, Mahmud's chronicler wrote: "Mahmud utterly ruined the prosperity of the country and performed those wonderful exploits by which the Hindus became like atoms of dust scattered in all directions...their scattered remains cherish, of course, the most inveterate aversion towards all Muslims. This is the reason too why Hindu sciences have retired far away from parts of the country conquered by us and have fled to places, which our hand cannot yet reach, to Kashmir, Benaras and other places."
The latter quote is especially important, because it suggests that prior to the Turkic conquest of Punjab, (and the imposition of Islamic rule), Hindu society provided scope for the study of science, but for such efforts to continue, scientifically-minded Hindus had to retreat further and further from the lands that were under attack.
With the exception of a small number of Hindus who saw upward mobility after volunteering their services to the armies of Ghaznavi and Ghauri (either as soldiers or as spies), the vast majority were left with no choice but to either convert to Islam or to be relegated to inferior social and political status and higher levels of taxation (if they chose to remain as Hindus). Moreover, even those that chose to convert to Islam were subject to systematic discrimination since the Turkish nobility refused to accept Indian converts to Islam as their equals. India's Turkish invaders thus became like a caste above all castes. Rather than the caste system being undermined by Islamic egalitarianism (as some have attempted to argue), new all-powerful castes of foreign-origin Muslims lorded over all others. The arrival of Islam merely cast a veil over overt caste-distinctions and prejudice, since by and large, upper-caste Hindu converts to Islam retained old caste loyalties even after conversion. Only in some cases were caste distinctions actually ameliorated (due to the succesful intervention of the Sufis), but this also occurred under the influence of some of the Vaishanava and Bhakti movements in Hindu India.
(Although over time, inter-marriage and the rise and fall of dynasties led to a certain degree of equalization amongst foreign-origin Muslims and Indian Muslim converts (as also between Hindus and Muslims), it is noteworthy that foreign-born Muslims (typically Ashrafs) retained some degree of aloofness from other Indian Muslims, and were amongst the chief supporters of the Muslim League, and were most instrumental in the formation of Pakistan. It is therefore not surprising that a version of history that suits this segment of the Muslim population has been foisted on all the people of Pakistan.)
In addition, the Ghaznavi and Ghauri invasions may have only served to de-politicize the Punjabi masses who became more introverted and many may have converted to Islam more out of expediency than any real conviction. It should also be noted that as per the notes of chroniclers such as Al-Beruni, Punjabi society had a somewhat liberal and detached attitude towards religion, and Al-Beruni was surprised to find the absence of the sort of messianic zeal he had observed amongst his Central Asian religious brethren. He also found the degree to which Punjabi men consulted their wives on virtually all important matters unusual - expecting the men to take decisions more unilaterally - perhaps in consultation with other men (as was customary amongst the Central Asian Turks), but not with their spouses. It is therefore likely that these invasions led to significant sociological changes that in particular reduced the space for spiritual and philosophical enquiry and further circumscribed the role of women in society.
It may be worth emphasizing that prior to the Islamic invasions the rules of warfare between warring Kshatriyas were such that civilian populations were not to be violated. There was no sanction for mass slavery or the mass rape of women. However, in the slave-owning and slave-trading culture of the Central Asian invaders, it was routine for civilians to be violated, to be raped and/or enslaved. As a consequence, this must have led to a considerable reduction in the freedom and the rights of women and children, who could no longer travel freely or risk being seen in public alone and unattended.
Unsurprisingly, Ghazni's rise was itself short-lived and the city was ransacked a decade after Mahmud's death by the ruler of Ghur (whose clan had a history of trading in slaves). Thus, Ghazni suffered the same fate that had been meted out earlier on cities such as Kannauj and Mathura. By and large, the Turkic Islamic empires in Punjab and Northern India were extremely unstable. It was much easier for the invaders to launch raids against the Hindu kingdoms that adjoined Punjab than successfully govern any territories they won. It is also notable that the fall of Western Punjab led to more organized resistance further East in the Doaba. Jaipal's son Anandapala not only received support from the wealthy, but also from weavers and other artisans. But in the end, the persistence of the invaders prevailed over the armies of Raja Anandapala.
Chronicles from the Sultanate period in Punjab and Delhi point to an era of constant court intrigues, conspiracies, murders of kings and wars of succession. Punjab - which was at the very front lines of the invasions was naturally most vulnerable, and its flat plains offered few geographical features that could have facilitated guerilla-wars against unpopular alien rule. But the Rajputana region, the hills East of Punjab and the Central Plateaus regions were always strongly contested, and were much harder to retain by any invader. Later, Yadav, Sikh and Jat chieftains began to offer militant resistance even in the plains. This to some degree explains the marked difference in the extent of Islamic penetration in the Indian subcontinent.
In any case, what is apparent is that at least during the earliest centuries of Turkic Islamic conquest, Punjab experienced a phase of considerable political instability, and may have suffered through a period of economic and cultural decline, perhaps, considerable stress and anxiety (if not outright abuse and oppression). At best, some sections of society may have survived by adapting to the demands of the invaders.
By and large, Punjab's cultural revival took place much later, under the influence of indigenous Sufi philosophers and artisans who were instrumental in the creation of a new architectural idiom and had a strong influence in the growth of the crafts industries. Multan was at the very heart of this Sufi-oriented tradition (until the rise of the Mughals, when Lahore gained in prominence).
But even any indirectly positive legacy must be weighed against the onerous and dramatic rise in the export of slaves from Punjab. For although the subjugation of Punjab may have facilitated the rapid growth of magnificent trading cities and political centers along the silk route (such as Khiva, Samarqand, Bukhara in Central Asia, and Herat and other great cities in what is now Afghanistan), underlying the medieval glamor and glory of the silk route was the plunder of Northern India's agricultural prosperity, and the significant enslavement of its peasant masses.
It is therefore ironic that the land which may have paid quite a heavy price for the invasions emanating from Ghazni and Ghur should today be ruled by a military elite that enjoins its people to revere these invaders as ideological heroes. And thus persists, the ideological enslavement to an externally-coerced medieval outlook. The all-round progress of the people of Punjab is held back., even as other nations prosper and develop at a much faster pace.
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