Sufi Currents and Civilization in the Islamic Courts

No serious examination of the civilizations that flourished in the courts of the Islamic rulers is possible without an understanding of Sufi currents that played a vital - even decisive role in shaping the cultural output of the great Islamic empires.  As any student of world history may note, civilization typically comes to a grinding halt wherever the writ of a revealed religion runs supreme. For any civilization to blossom, there has to be a certain intellectual and cultural space that is relatively free from dogma and hidebound traditions. In the earliest examples of the Islamic courts, particularly during the reign of the Abbasids in Baghdad, there was an informal separation of church and state and Arab civilization was able to make important gains , drawing inputs from a variety of eclectic sources - both indigenous and external (such as Indian and Mediterranean). 
But once the paramountcy of the Quran, the Hadith and the  Shariat  laws began to be more strictly enforced - the Islamic courts needed some alternate current to prevent the newly established Islamic societies from slipping into the dark ages as had occurred in the Christian kingdoms of early medieval Europe.  Sufism thus emerged as what seemed like a protestant and liberalizing current, that eventually became the primary vehicle for intellectual advance and  the dissemination of culture in societies governed by Islamic sovereigns. 
Sufi currents were  essential in easing the transition from the earlier Hindu, Buddhist, Judaic, Christian, Manichean, and Zoroastrian societies that had existed prior to the victory of the Islamic conquerors. Sufism provided a way to reconcile some of the religious doctrines of these earlier cultural and/or religious systems. Liberal Sufi scholars went to great lengths in establishing a sense of continuity and evolution amongst the various revealed faiths - such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam. In helping to  reconcile formally  differing beliefs amongst Christians, Manicheans, Jews, and Muslims, such Sufis were instrumental in limiting political tensions and in facilitating a modicum of social peace and stability.
This type of work was not inimical to the political interests of the Islamic conquerors and was generally tolerated, although often,  Sufi scholars had to take great pains to reassure the orthodox Ulema that their scholarly treatises were not  inconsistent with the worldview of Islam.  Kalabadhi  (10th C, Bukhara), author of the Taaruf, and  Persian scholar Hujwiri (11th C), author of the Kashf, attempted to situate their work within the broad contours  of Islamic tradition.  Hujwiri  suggested that there was a place for high culture and spiritual development apart from the following of religious rules. Although equally, he emphasized that he was not challenging or rejecting anything contained in the Quran.
But even as many Sufi scholars staunchly affirmed their loyalty to the Quran and Shari'at law, a few were able to use Sufism as a means of escaping the patriarchal weight and sectarian authority of Islam. Some of the earliest of the Sufi scholars were  women such as Rabia (9th C) and Nuri (10th C) - who both emphasized worldly renunciation and suggested that spiritual salvation lay in discovering the 'god' within.  In their rejection of orthodox rituals and the domination of the conservative clergy, they shared a certain commonality with some of their Hindu or Buddhist predecessors. 
As Sufi literature and practice evolved, there was much that Indians would later find oddly reminiscent of what had been emphasized not only by some  authors of the Upanishads,  or practitioners of Buddhism, but also by Indian folk  and devotional saints. Mughal prince Dara Shukoh in his  "Confluence of the Two Seas" made special note of this. 
In fact, many aspects of Sufi belief systems and practice had their parallels in Indian philosophical literature, but often, amongst the more conforming streams of Sufi discourse, these had to be circumscribed within the boundaries of what Islam could politically tolerate. Even though liberal Sufis (like many Hindu Vedantics) considered formal religion a shell - they didn't reject formal religion - allowing that for the average practitioner, day-to-day rituals and traditional religious practices could play a useful role. Most were not outright rebels - but adapted to the pressures of mainstream religion. Nevertheless, liberal Sufis were much less likely to approve of rigid and literalist interpretations of the Quran. "Words cannot be used in referring to religious truth, except as analogy". This sentiment of  Hakim Sanai as expressed in his  'The Walled Garden of Truth' echoed what is most immediately evident in the Kena and Chandogya Upanishads. 
Over time, a variety of Sufi currents flourished. The more advanced of the Sufi scholars worried less about Quranic compatibility, and emphasized that there was a spiritual truth that exceeded what could be gleaned from  the standard religious texts. There was an emphasis on spiritual discovery and cultural evolution - through practical experience, through the development of intuition and a sharpened world perspective as opposed to the mere repetition of dogma. As the Sufis synthesized older ideas and philosophical traditions that attracted them - they also transcended them in some ways,  adding their own unique and perspicacious insights as they went along.
Amongst the most interesting of these were the  Spanish Sufis of the 'Illuminist' school - many of whom were great admirers of Indian civilization - and had access to translations of Indian philosophical and scientific texts. The Spanish Sufis took a great interest in preserving and enhancing philosophical and scientific knowledge, and had a tremendous influence on  Franciscan Monks such as  Roger Bacon (1268) who thus summarized their world view: "There are two modes of knowledge, through argument and experience. Argument brings conclusions and compels us to concede them, but it does not cause certainty nor remove doubts in order that the mind may remain at rest in truth, unless this is provided by experience."
Mulla Nasruddin immortalized by The Subtleties of the Incomparable Nasruddin  communicated through witty parables in the manner of Birbal, and became an illustrious example of the Sufi satirist. Later Sufi  poets like Kabir in India often brought a wry sense of humor, or a touch of folk wisdom to their poetry, and like their counterparts amongst the Indian Bhakti saints or Burmese (or Japanese) Buddhist Monks, used  fables and parables to comment on life and the human situation - subtly conveying their wisdom - and shedding light on  moral and ethical dilemmas. Although much of the primary focus was on discovering spiritual "truths" there were secular aspects in their writings that had a broader  appeal. In this sense, such Sufi stories shared a kinship with folk literature found throughout the world's cultures and could even be thought of as continuing  in the tradition of the Panchatantra or Aesop's Fables.
Some of the finest of the  Sufi literary and poetic output dealt with the psychology of romantic love, perhaps as a consequence of how life in a sexually conservative, puritanical society led to romantic  and erotic feelings having to be sublimated. Often, the outpourings of emotion that may have otherwise been considered immoral or illicit (as in the love of someone of the same gender) were situated in a devotional or mystical spiritual framework to escape social and political censure. Fariduddin Attar (Nishapur, Iran, early 13th C) and Jalaluddin Rumi (Balkh, Afghanistan, 13th C) were amongst those whose writings dealt with the theme of romantic love. 
Both spoke of various stages of human evolution in terms of spiritual progress  and Attar noted: "To abandon something because others have misused it may be the height of folly; the Sufic truth cannot be encompassed in rules and regulations, in formulas and rituals - but yet it is partially present in all these things."
Rumi appeared to endorse a theory of social evolution that resembled earlier Indian spiritual theories: "I died as inert matter - and became a plant; And as a plant I died and became an animal; And as an animal I died and became a man; So why should I fear losing my human character? I shall die as a man, to rise in angelic form" -  in Mathnavi, Story 17
Like many other Sufis who were skeptical of  religious and philosophical charlatans (as was Kabir, who came later) Rumi wrote: "He who is fortunately enlightened knows that sophistry is from the Devil and love from Adam" - in Mathnavi. Similiar sentiments were also expressed by Nuruddin Jami (Khurasan, 15th C):  "The dry cloud, waterless, can have no rain-giving quality" while referring to the routine and mechanical practice of rituals and outdated  religious practices.
Rumi is  known for several other pithy sayings: A man never having seen water is thrown blindfolded into it, and feels it. When the bandage is removed, he knows what it is. Until then he only knows it by it's effect. -  in  Fihi  Ma Fihi.  Speaking about imitation, he said:  "The canal may not itself drink, but it performs the function of conveying water to the thirsty ".  Highlighting how truth could be conveyed in more than one way, he wrote:  "A tale, fictitious or otherwise, illuminates truth". 
Amongst Rumi's most interesting observations was a  notion that Europeans might be more likely to associate with Hegel: "Opposite things work together, even though nominally opposed" - in Fihi Ma Fihi   
Sheikh Saadi of Shiraz (13th C), a contemporary of Rumi, and author of the Gulistan (Rose Garden) and Bustan (Orchard) is also renowned for his thoughtful insights into human nature. Educated in Baghdad, he was widely-traveled, and had also visited India. Like Rumi, Saadi left a deep imprint on Sufi orders in India, and across the Middle East (from Damascus to Kabul). Notable in his writings are critiques of authoritarian and unjust rule, and miserliness amongst the rich (a theme also developed by Kabir).
Although, liberal Sufi orders (in India and the Middle East) were primarily concerned with "spiritual" nourishment, and  came to be mainly  associated with an attitude of skepticism towards secular life (or renunciation of it), admirers of the Sufi path (such as 20th C Indian commentator, Sheikh Idries Shah) assert that the ideal Sufi alternated detachment and identification with life : But unlike the absolute retreatism from the real world advocated by certain Vedantic and Buddhist trends, Sufis do not encourage a complete withdrawal from the real world. Instead they are encouraged to participate in the real world, even as they are supposed to inculcate the ability to be detached from it - the ideal Sufi is supposed to find a balance between detachment and participation - between logic and mysticism - (in The Sufis, Doubleday) 
Idries Shah also argues that in the Sufi worldview, mankind is infinitely perfectible - that perfection comes through attunement with the rest of the world, and it calls for a balance between the physical and spiritual world. He also refers to the tendency amongst Sufis to seek universals - to harmonize, and to see their role as awakening a higher consciousness amongst those that followed standard religion.
In the 17th C,  Sirajudin Abbasi, (b. 1649, Kashmir) wrote of Sufis: "If you revere them as saints, you will benefit from their sainthood; but if you work with them as associates, you will benefit from their company." Enjoining his followers to spread Sufi doctrines, he wrote in his Safarnama:  "Among roses, be a rose, among thorns, be a thorn"
Abbasi was not alone in his appreciation of the Sufis. By and large, the record of the Sufis has been assessed with a considerable degree of sympathy in India, particularly  by  scholars who are generally speaking admirers of Islamic civilization, or attribute to the Sufis a special place in developing India's syncretic culture.  Sufis are particularly credited for their expressive poetry and literature, as well as for their contributions to the arts.   
However, such enthusiastic assessments need to be evaluated with a measure of caution. Once the Islamic conquests had defeated and emasculated earlier Hindu and Jain civilizations, Sufic Islam might easily  appear to be more  fecund and profound in comparison to Islamic orthodoxy. There is always a danger in over-romanticizing.  For instance, although in some Sufi strains,  Sufis were encouraged to make contributions in all aspects of human culture including painting, architectural design and decoration, the industrial arts, dance and music, and also astronomy and mathematics, not all Sufi practitioners took this advice to heart, and most Sufis (like their Bhakti counterparts) passed their days volunteering at charities or offering spiritual discourses. In India, many Sufi shrines became popular Muslim equivalents of wish-fulfilling temples where devotees came to seek the blessings of a revered saint in the hope of gaining good fortune, or perhaps the lifting of injurious circumstances.
But the most serious indictments against Sufis come from scholars who point to how Sufi scholars also worked as spies, wrote sharply critical and misleading essays about Hindu civilization, and  often paid glowing tributes to the invaders and conquerors of India in their writings.  There is considerable substance to this criticism since the destruction of "idolatory" was not opposed by the Sufis who accompanied the invaders. Like  El-Ghazali (Mashad, Iran) who saw the essence of his work as reconciling Islam with intellectualism - and saw Sufis as complementing,  even strengthening Islamic orthodoxy,  most Sufis tried to provide a human face to Islam, but did not necessarily argue against, or strive to prevent the barbarity of the military conquerors who waged their bloody campaigns in the name of Islam.  Even as Sufi orders loyal to Islam  promoted the notion of  love and brotherhood - such noble sentiments were never extended to include "idol-worshippers". And there were even orders that had a distinctly elitist ring to their world outlook. The subordinate position of women was also rarely challenged (although some Sufi schools such as the 'Illuminists' had women as leading scholars and teachers) Furthermore, it should be emphasized that several Sufi orders were extremely militant and unabashedly endorsed violent hatred of non-Muslims. In ther support of a violent Islamic Jehad against non-Muslims, they shared little with popular notions of Sufis as peaceful bridge-builders. Sirhindi is just one notable example of the Sufi who endorsed hatred and violence against the non-Muslim. 
It is therefore very important to distinguish between the different Sufi strains. On the positive side, one may observe how Sufis invariably provided a touch of color and beauty to what might have otherwise been  rather cold and stark reigns. Sufis played an important role in Afghanistan, particularly in Herat - which emerged as a renowned centre for miniature painting. In Western Punjab, fine examples of Punjab's medieval architecture are to be found in the shrines commemorating Sufi Saints - such as in Multan, Uchh, Dera Ghazi Khan, Dera Adil, Dera Din Panah and Dera Ismail Khan. In these monuments, it almost seems as though the spirit of Taxila was reborn. Sufis also played a role in the regional Sultanates such as in Jaunpur, Sindh, Gujarat, Bengal and the Deccan, where aspects from the older Indian traditions were  incorporated with great effect in the new architecture.
Also unlike the many Sufi streams that were politically allied to orthodoxy, some Sufi mystic cults adopted a more ambiguous position, using secret codes and mysticism as an instrument of dissent. Mysticism afforded some protection from the religious police of the orthodoxy - because often the mystic would claim madness, or to have been in a mystic trance when  charged with espousing heretical ideas. Sufis would claim that their irreverent statements were not made in full control of their normal faculties, or in full consciousness, or with any willful intention to blaspheme. 
In this manner, Sufi streams that were  decidedly subaltern in character were able to survive (albeit precariously), and thus became means of expressing  social criticism. In Turkey and in Persia - these subaltern streams attracted a large number of followers - particularly in the arts and crafts guilds. This led to a certain measure of political protection for artisans and limited the extent to which they could be exploited by the royal establishment. 
But the growing influence of the radical Sufis also led to a conservative backlash, and in Iran,  some of the most radical orders (such as the Ni'matullah) were forced to flee and take refuge in India. Nevertheless, the more pliant orders were allowed to remain and were  able to exercise an important degree of cultural influence on Safavid Iran, particularly in the realm of art and architecture. Sufis were often instrumental in the design and execution of  the grand and imposing monuments that graced cities like Isfahan and Tabriz, or contributed to the artistry of Shiraz. 
 Sufi mystic cults also attracted followers from the artisan communities in India, especially weavers, but because the conversion to Islam was only partial in India, there were  several alternatives to Sufism in the variety of  Bhakti and Tantric cults that provided a similar outlet. Sikhism emerged as one of the most powerful of the subaltern movements that owed part of it's original inspiration to Sufi mysticism, and the influence of Sufi thought on the Sikh Gurus continues to be  acknowledged with a measure of respect and reverence. However, once a section of the Sikh polity ascended into the ruling class, Sikhism's radical character was gradually eroded, (and this also happened with other Sufi orders when they became close to the ruling aristocracy).
Nevertheless, while it is undeniable that it was the Sufis who played a decisive role in the creation of art and architecture in the Islamic kingdoms, one should not allow this realization to detract from the more sinister role played by many Sufi orders who used Sufi mysticism and Sufi love of culture as mere baits to soften opposition to Islamic orthodoxy and simply leveraged the liberal Sufis to expand the political power of Islam. This is a very crucial point that naive fans of Sufism tend to ignore. More and more recent research is exposing how shrewd supporters of Islamic supremacy merely manipulated the Sufi orders to facilitate violent mass conversions of non-Muslims to Islam. As historian K.S. Lal points out, even Sufis identified with a supposedly liberal Sufi order like the Chistia Silsila endorsed the Sharia and jiziya on Hindus. It is thus important to separate popular myths about Sufis from the actual record that might reveal many so-called Sufi saints to be be deadly enemies of Hindus and other non Muslims.

The Rise and Fall of the Mughals

No period in Indian history has drawn as much attention and scholarly research as has the period in Indian history that corresponds with Mughal rule. Western and many Indian historians alike have focused on the reign of the Mughals almost to the point of total neglect and exclusion of other periods in Indian history. In-depth investigation of other ruling dynasties whether subordinate to the Mughals (such as the lesser-known Rajputs or Bundelkhandis) or preceding them (such as the Parmars, Kakathiyas, or Sharqis) or their southern contemporaries (such as Tamil Nadu's Pandyas) has rarely attracted the scholarly attention of influential historians, and often their role in Indian history has been seen as peripheral to that of the Mughals, or their contribution to Indian civilization seen as tangential and marginal.
Journalists, art critics and popular historians have been particularly infected by such biases, and even highly respected art critics and social scientists have written quite dismissively of India's regional kingdoms that preceded Mughal rule or rose in the wake of it's precipitous decline.
While the romance of the Taj Mahal (and other such grand monuments) and the extraordinary brilliance of Mughal artifacts might partially justify and explain the special attention Western and Indian scholars have paid to the Mughal courts, it cannot be denied that at least some of this interest echoes colonially motivated biases leading to slanted interpretations of Indian history. It is also motivated by the tendency to view history from the perspective of the most powerful rulers and elites rather than from the perspective of the masses or intermediate categories.
While the Indianness or foreignness of the Mughals has been quite hotly debated in recent years, one aspect of the history of the Mughals that has largely escaped scholarly attention - (even by subaltern scholars) has been the role of expansionist militarism in shaping the reign of virtually every Mughal ruler up to Aurangzeb (with the possible exclusion of Jehangir).
Although war-making was not a uniquely Mughal practice, the centrality of the military campaigns in Mughal decision-making and administration does stand out. In the frequency, scale and intensity of their military campaigns, the Mughals had more in common with the ruling heads of the Delhi Sultanate than is commonly acknowledged.
This is not to say that there weren't important distinctions. Unlike many of the earlier invaders, the Mughals were relatively more conscious of being in a foreign land, andin his memoirs Babar spoke very deliberately of the need for conducting a secular policy in a country that was predominantly non-Islamic. In this respect, the Mughals were much more aware of the need to gain legitimacy and to win political allies in an alien land.
Their taste for the fine things in life - for beautifully designed artifacts and the enjoyment and appreciation of cultural activities also distinguished them from other interlopers who were skilled at war-making and little else. But it should be noted that the reigns of Akbar and Aurangzeb in particular, were marked by a shrewd (and sometimes ruthless) approach in the conduct of their political and military strategies.
Several aspects of their policy illustrate the importance of their military campaigns. Capitals were frequently moved to centers more suited to the conduct of specific military campaigns. Alliances with Rajput rulers were sought based on their ability to contribute to the Mughal war efforts. Investments were made in upgrading the weapons of war and ensuring that Mughal military technology maintained it's edge. Every Mughal prince was groomed in the battle arts not only through early training but through hands-on experience in real battles. So entrenched was the culture of war that it pit brother against brother in battles of succession.
This concentration on war efforts emerges quite vividly from court chronicles and surviving correspondence between Shahjahan and the young Aurangzeb where almost nothing else is discussed but the progress of the latest war effort. War scenes and gory depictions of battles were also common themes in the miniatures commissioned during the reign of Akbar.
The militarist character of the Mughals was not entirely unexpected since had they not been seeped in the tradition of warfare, they would have never attempted to conquer Northern India and extend their control over the rest of the Indian subcontinent in the first place.
In this respect, the Mughals were very much in the tradition of the nomadic warrior clans that periodically swooped down from the grasslands and deserts of Central Asia and either plundered and raided the settled agricultural civilizations or succeeded in conquering them. Not only India, but China, Eastern Europe, and the fertile crescents of the Middle East also experienced such attacks and invasions. Since the nomadic hunter clans lacked agricultural territories that could be tapped for their surplus, the only means to wealth in such parts of the globe were raids on settled civilizations or looting or taxation of trade caravans. Trading in slaves was another source of income. Seasoned and practised in the art of warfare, the nomadic warrior clans often prevailed with considerable ease over the armies of the settled civilizations who were usually taken by surprise and were inexperienced at handling the unconventional (and terrorist-like) tactics of the invaders.
Over time, in settled civilizations, the cost to both sides of protracted battles and the potential destruction of vital crop-lands and urban settlements created a natural resistance to internecine warfare. When the combatants were roughly evenly matched (as was often the case) decisive victories were virtually impossible. Even if one side finally prevailed, the cost of victory would be very high. (Ashoka's conversion to Buddhism, in part, came about as a result of the massive loss of life that took place on both sides in the Kalingan battles).
In India, this led not only to critiques of war from Jains and Buddhists but also from followers of the various Bhakti streams that drew the artisans and the peasantry. Even Kautilya's Arthashastra (which did not call for eschewing war) counseled kings in approaching war with shrewd caution and foresight. Kings were advised to make peace and offer diplomatic treaties in exchange for war whenever decisive victories were deemed unlikely. While such pragmatism did not eliminate wars, it did help in limiting their frequency and length. And since agricultural taxes were the primary source of income for both the warring factions, it was in the mutual interest of both parties to enforce a culture of chivalry and ethics in war that prevented civilian casualties and avoided the destruction of farmland, orchards and irrigation works.
When the Arab armies invaded Sindh, the local populations were caught completely off guard when their irrigation systems were destroyed and all the rules of chivalry considered customary in the subcontinent appeared to have little relevance for the invaders who sought victory at any cost. Of course, by the time the Mughals arrived in the Indian subcontinent, Northern India was no longer ruled by Hindu kings. But the Islamic rulers were no more adept at preventing conquests from new invaders. Once victorious, no Islamic conqueror was able to establish a stable dynastic reign for any length of time. New invaders arrived on the scene with regularity, and defeated previous rulers, many of whom were hated and despised by the local populace. Lacking popular support, none were able to establish kingdoms of any size.
Thus the initial victory of Babar over the Lodhis was not a particularly remarkable event. An event of far greater consequence was the defeat of Humayun at the hands of Sher Shah Suri - the Narnaul (Haryana) born son of a regional Mughal administrator. Born and raised in India, Sher Shah Suri was much more familiar with Indian conditions and keenly aware of how Humayun's hold on power was extremely tenuous. Taking advantage of the hollowness of support for the second Mughal, he succeeded in subduing Mughal holdouts and unifying Punjab and the Gangetic plain. The construction of the Grand Trunk Road and the launching of new (and specialized) manufacturing towns in the plains facilitated in the expansion of trade and industry. Administrative changes and social reforms that helped in creating a stable tax base and a modicum of legitimacy for the kingdom were also introduced. When Humayun returned to the throne in Delhi, he thus inherited the foundations of a potentially larger and more wealthy empire.
During Akbar's reign (and to a much greater extent during the reign of Jehangir), trade activities were further facilitated by the construction of numerous caravansarais (inns) and hospitals along the Grand Trunk Road, especially in Punjab. State-owned karkhanas (factories) were commissioned so as to produce high-quality luxury goods for use in the courts and for export. Income from agriculture and trade filled the Mughal treasuries and was used to fund the series of war campaigns that took the Mughal armies deep into the Deccan plateau and as far east as Assam, and westwards to the Afghan border with Iran. These war campaigns depended in large measure on the collaboration of the Rajput and Bundelkhand armies, who were won over through a combination of incentives and political coercion.
The sizeable tax base of the fertile plain of the Ganges enabled Akbar to entice the allegiance of the most powerful Rajput chiefs (such as those of Jaipur and Bikaner), who were granted tax rights on parts of the Gangetic plain. Marriage alliances cemented the relationships, and some of the most decisive Mughal victories were achieved under the military leadership of Jaipur's Raja Man Singh. Others were coerced into accepting Mughal "partnership" on unequal terms through a combination of military threats and by holding members of the royal clans hostage in Delhi. The hill Rajputs, the kingdoms of Datia, Jhansi and Orchha, were all required to pay tribute, and provide soldiers for the Mughal expeditions. Those who resisted such coercive collaboration (such as Gwalior) were suitably punished so as to warn others of what may befall them if they rebelled.
In this manner, the Mughal empire expanded to cover almost the entire length and breadth of the Indian subcontinent (excluding only the deep South). But military success did not guarantee stability or popular acceptance. While initially, income from agricultural taxes and trade exceeded the cost of the incessant war campaigns (and the lavish expenditure on locally procured and imported luxury goods), by the time Aurangzeb took over the throne, the Mughal treasuries had been virtually depleted.
The earliest of the Islamic invasions into the Indian subcontinent had paid for themselves through the pillage and plunder of temple wealth and jewelry and other savings of the defeated populations (which may have been accumulated over several generations). The invading armies also profited from the sale of captured soldiers and civilians taken as slaves. However, by the time the Mughals arrived on the Indian scene, all the temples with any wealth had already been plundered, and considerable resistance had developed to the practice of taking slaves through warfare. As a result, these avenues of wealth were no longer available to the Mughals who had to rely mainly on agricultural taxes. Trade was not heavily taxed because like their predecessors, the Mughals depended on the support of the mercantile classes in legitimizing their rule. Agricultural taxes thus reached an all-time high in India during Mughal rule (and were exceeded only by the British colonizers).
This naturally led to constant rebellions in large parts of the Mughal territories. The hill Rajputs, the Mewar Rajputs and the Central Indian kings resisted paying tribute, while many local nobles reneged on passing on the taxes to Delhi. Many local officials (in attempting to emulate the luxurious lifestyles of the Mughal courts) spent all the tax income locally, and got away by bribing Mughal officials in Delhi. During the reign of Shah Jahan, a new problem appeared. Even though the demand for Indian manufactures and exports had reached unprecedented levels, little of that wealth reached the Mughal treasuries since traders outside India began to hold on to most of the profits. A series of unsuccessful military campaigns were initiated in an attempt to achieve greater control over India's export trade, but these efforts came to naught. At the same time, Shah Jehan's appetite for grand building projects and luxury imports remained undiminished.
Fearing the bankruptcy of the Mughal state, Aurangzeb staged a military coup against his father and put an end to all lavish spending. But without the ability to dole out expensive gifts and tax rights, Aurangzeb relied more and more on the orthodox clergy to legitimize his rule (a trend initiated by Shah Jahan). But this was hardly the solution for the Mughal state's diminishing credibility. Although Aurangzeb managed to keep up the outward appearance of invincibility, the Mughal state was in fact in severe crisis. After Aurangzeb's death, centrifugal forces quickly spun out of control, and only some of the plains close to Delhi eventually remained in Mughal hands.
The peasantry almost throughout the Mughal territories had been chafing under the burden of high taxes. In Punjab, the peasants and artisans had been radicalized under the influence of Guru Gobind Singh who encouraged the equal participation of women - both in matters of religion and on the battlefield. In Haryana, Jat and Yadav allies declared their independence. In the Marathwada region, a multi-caste alliance of Brahmins, Kshatriyas, volunteers from peasant and artisan castes, along with disaffected Muslims joined hands in the Maratha rebellions. Regional administrators declared their independence in the Afghan region, and in Kashmir, Awadh and Bengal. The hill Rajputs, the Bundelkhandis and the Adivasi-origin rulers of the Jabalpur/Nagpur belt - all refused to pay tribute.
Some historians have attempted to lay the blame for this Mughal collapse entirely on Aurangzeb's zealotry, contrasting Aurangzeb's religious conservatism with Akbar's eclectic tolerance which led to architectural innovations and cultural synthesis. Admirers of the syncretic traditions that developed in Akbar's court point to the stylistic fusion that took place in Fatehpur Sikri, and how some talented Hindus played an important role in his administration.
But even as Aurangzeb's sectarian messianic tendencies may have been the immediate catalyst for some of the rebellions that triggered the downfall of the Mughal empire, they should not be seen as the sole explanation for the disintegration of the Mughal empire. Challenges to Mughal rule had already begun right after Akbar's military successes. And although Aurangzeb identified closely with Islamic orthodoxy - the employment of Hindus in Aurangzeb's court was at a higher level than what prevailed in the court of Akbar. Like his predecessors, Aurangzeb also continued with the practice of seeking alliances with Hindu rulers, but abandoned the practice of developing marital ties with them. Without the bonds of inter-marriage, and with a tax base that was becoming less stable, the motivations for the Rajputs to fight Mughal battles was waning, and coercion was becoming less effective.
But even more fundamental factors were also in play. The high rate of taxation on the peasantry was simply unsustainable. Another important reason for the unraveling of Mughal power was that beyond Sindh, Punjab, Kashmir and the Yamuna and Gangetic plains, Mughal rule had simply not made enough of a positive contribution to justify its continuance.
It is therefore ironic how some of the most ardent fans of economic and political decentralization in modern India have written admiringly of the "unified" Mughal empire, as though centralization was an end in itself. It is important to note that the "unification" of India that Akbar had achieved was almost entirely through war and coercion. But more important, the benefits of this centralization did not flow throughout the empire. Some territories paid tribute but received no tangible gains in exchange. In particular, the regions corresponding to present-day Gujarat, Chhatisgarh, Chota Nagpur and Vidarbha, Eastern Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand and much of North Bihar were starved of investment, and experienced stagnation or decline.
Beyond the main trade routes that linked Northern India to the rest of the world, the Mughal state invested neither in agricultural expansion nor in manufacturing or infrastructure to promote trade. Since the bulk of the Mughal manufacturing towns were located either along the Yamuna and Gangetic plains (or along the Indus), it is no coincidence that Mughal legitimacy survived primarily only in these regions of India.
Historians who write admiringly and uncritically about Akbar's "secularism" and eclectic tastes, and draw too sharp a distinction between Akbar and Aurangzeb miss such crucial points. It should be clarified that although most of the Mughals were consciously "secular" - at no point during their rule did the Mughals allot administrative posts in proportion to the actual population of Hindus and Muslims. Muslims were always over-represented. And in their support of the arts and music, the tastes of the early Mughals remained strongly biased towards Central Asian, Persian and Chinese traditions. Miniatures sponsored by Babar were entirely in the Samarqand/Bukhara tradition, while during the reign of Akbar, Persian and Western imitations also became popular. Only with Jehangir did the Mughal arts lose their hotchpotch and uneven character and begin to develop into a distinctive and more consistent style.
Jehangir (born of a Rajput mother) was considerably influenced by Rajput tastes, and rewarded skilled Hindu artisans with prominent positions in his court. With a remarkable eye for excellence in design and execution in the arts and crafts, he encouraged talent and promoted merit without discrimination. He also took an interest in local flora and fauna, and like his father, had an interest in philosophy. Dara Shukoh and Shah Jahan were inheritors of this taste for creative sophistication and ornamental exuberance. With Shah Jahan, a refined delicacy came to define courtly tastes, but there was also a trend towards rarified formalism, which prevented the Mughal tradition from imbibing popular and folk influences in the manner of the Rajput or Bundelkhand rulers.
Mughal courtly culture also remained somewhat apart from the folk traditions of the Indian masses through the promotion of Persian as the language of culture, and Urdu as the language of administration. Although popular with urban intellectuals and the cultural elite, Urdu with it's plethora of Persian and Arabic words, and non-Indian script could not have gained mass acceptance, and remained a language primarily of the elite. Outside the Hindi belt, this was an even bigger problem. Considering the steady drain of wealth from areas further away from the Mughal capitals and urban centers, it was almost inevitable that alienation from Mughal rule would set in very quickly. The plateau regions of Central India (and other outlying regions) had simply no stake in a unified Mughal empire and that is why a broad and secular coalition of forces arose in defiance of Mughal authority in such areas.
A grave drawback of Mughal rule was the failure of the Mughal rulers to devote even a fraction of their treasuries on anything resembling modern education. Aurangzeb was especially skeptical about the relevance of modern science and technology. Whereas the European nations had begun to invest in printed books and public universities, the Mughal rulers demonstrated at best a passing interest in the sciences. As a result, even though the Mughal empire under Aurangzeb had successfully fended off the expansion of European trading settlements in India, no durable foundation for the unity and scientific advancement of India had been laid by the Mughals. Mughal rule had left India largely incapable of dealing with the challenge of European military and cultural ascendance.
(This is not to say that the regional kingdoms were any more up to the task of resisting colonization, since inter-regional rivalries and tensions equally prevented the formation of a united front against the British. But the point is more that centralization from above - without greater measure of popular legitimacy, without mass support and acceptance had its serious limitations.)
Unfortunately, such shortcomings of Mughal rule have largely escaped the attention of serious historians in India. And those who have been critical have focused almost exclusively on the communal angle (on the repression of Hindu religion and culture), ignoring socio-economic and political factors that may have been equally, or far more germane. Communally focused critics of Mughal rule have often ignored how particular caste categories offered their services and allegiance to Mughal rule, and received tangible benefits in exchange. Kayasthas in particular experienced upward mobility as they rose from being scribes and junior record-keepers to hold important administrative posts, and achieved a social rank comparable to court Brahmins. Mercantile caste categories also had a stake in the success of Mughal rule. Hindu money-lenders and shop-keepers did quite well in the prosperous Mughal towns, and a majority of the top revenue administrators under the Mughals (even during the reign of Aurangzeb) were either Hindu Banias or Brahmins.
Bihar's Maithil Brahmins had been promoted by earlier Islamic rulers, and their regional and local authority was not challenged by the Mughals. And while other regional Hindu rulers (such as the Mewar and Hill Rajputs, or the Bundelkhandis) often felt oppressed by Mughal rule, they lived lives of considerable comfort and leisure, and this restrained them from organizing collectively and mounting any serious challenge to Mughal rule.
On the other hand, the fascination for the Mughals amongst British (or British-influenced) historians, art critics and Indologists is not too hard to explain. By treating Mughal rule as the high point of Indian civilization and by over-emphasizing its Persian inspiration, British scholars of Indian civilization have tried to create the false impression that all great things in India have required external stimulus.
Their interest in Mughal rule has also stemmed from the subconscious desire to represent colonial rule in India as not too different from that of the Mughals. The fact that the Mughals came as alien conquerors and created a vast empire on the basis of shrewdly conceived coercive political strategies and military victories gives apologists for British colonial rule almost an excuse to ignore the uniquely devastating consequences of colonization. That the Mughals increased the taxes on the peasantry, introduced a language that was laden with foreign words and written in a foreign script, that in certain respects they remained aloof and apart from indigenous cultural trends - all this made British rule appear more as continuation than sharp departure from the Indian experience.
But in spite of such parallels, there are vital and important distinctions that separate Mughal rule in India from British rule in India. Firstly, at no point during Mughal rule was the impoverishment of the peasantry and the broad masses as extreme as it was during the period of British colonization. It should also be noted that whereas Indian manufactures acquired a well-deserved reputation for outstanding quality, and were in great demand during the reigns of Jehangir and Shahjahan, India became a dumping ground for European exports and manufacturing suffered a precipitous decline after the defeat at Plassey.
For all their flaws, and their alien instincts, the Mughals came to settle in India. Over time, they became steadily indigenized, and that is why the last Mughals resisted the British during the rebellion of 1857. Akbar's policy of inter-marriage with Rajput princesses not only served a tactical purpose in the realm of military policy, it also had the effect of indigenizing Mughal tastes. Although British historians and art critics have written at great length on how Akbar drew from the courts in Herat (now Afghanistan) and Shiraz or Tabriz (now Iran) - Jehangir's encouragement of bold colors and creative naturalist designs in the artifacts he commissioned owed much to Rajput traditions. Local influences rubbed off on the Mughals to a much greater extent than on the British rulers who virtually destroyed the cultural traditions of the areas they ruled directly.
But more importantly, even as the Mughals frittered away the wealth they extracted from the peasantry - their legacy of fine arts and architecture remained in India. India's wealth was not systematically transferred to another country. In the aftermath of their collapse, regional forces with greater popular acceptance took over and some indigenous cultural traditions reasserted themselves fairly quickly and easily. But the legacy of colonial plunder and cultural indoctrination has been much harder to reverse and erase. It continues to have an insidious effect on many aspects of Indian life.
Thus no matter how artfully British intellectuals have used their representations of Mughal rule to rationalize the immiserization of India during British rule, the colossal drain of wealth and psychic destruction that took place simply has no parallels in Indian history. For that reason, Mughal rule cannot and should not be equated to European colonization.
At the same time, for Indian (or Pakistani, Bangladeshi or Afghan) historians and social scientists interested in expanding democratic rights and furthering the process of social equity in the subcontinent, it is critical that Mughal rule be subject to greater scrutiny. The romance and mystique surrounding the Mughal era in India needs to be overcome but without falling into the communal trap where Mughal rule is seen as an even greater evil than colonization.

Punjab and the Ghazni and Ghur Invasions

Although it is not always acknowledged, the writing of history can often be a tool of official propaganda rather than simply an honest record of the truth. The exigencies of the two-nation theory and the ideological pressures required to preserve Pakistan as a foil to "Hindu-dominated" India have led to a considerable degree of obfuscation in history-writing in Pakistan. Whereas in Northern India, Mahmud of Ghazni (Ghaznavi) and Muhammad of Ghur (Ghauri) are widely seen as rapacious marauders, in Pakistan's ruling circles, both are seen as great warriors for an Islamic Jehad who founded highly cultured and justly administered kingdoms. 
Yet, a careful perusal of the surviving record appears  to indicate a picture that is far more complicated and far less flattering than implied by the court chroniclers of Ghouri and Ghaznavi (or by their present-day admirers). Just as official histories of the invasion of Sindh have been unduly romanticized (and sanitized so as to exclude uncomfortable facts and analysis), so too have been the conquests of Punjab by the Central Asian Turks.
While there is no doubt that both Ghouri and Ghaznavi possessed remarkable military skills and intellect, and fought with great shrewdness, persistence and tenacity, their achievements in other domains are somewhat more questionable. And the price of their military victories is not to be so easily dismissed. It is especially important to note that the impact of their military campaigns was felt very differently by different sections of the North Indian population.
First, it should be noted that there is considerable variance of opinion as to the motives of Ghouri and Ghaznavi as they attempted to overrun Northern India from their Turkic capitals in what is now Afghanistan. Whereas Utbi, Ghaznavi's court historian looked upon his military expeditions as "holy wars" for the 'extirpation of idolatry' and 'propagation of Islam', it is curious that even Multan (which had already come under Islamic influence) was not spared, and was also repeatedly attacked. If religious fervor were indeed a primary motive for the attacks, then it must be stated that the issue was more the assertion of Sunnism over the Shia and Ismaeli currents that had come to prevail in early 11th C Multan and Sindh. In any case, Indian historians such as Mohammad Habib are inclined to discount the 'Jehadi' dimension, and see economic and political factors to be of greater significance. 
Just prior to the invasion of Mahmud of Ghazni, all of the Kabul valley, the Peshawar region and Punjab were united in the Hindushahi kingdom of Jaipal, which for two centuries had successfully resisted onslaughts from the West. As one of the best irrigated regions near Ghazni, Punjab offered not only a rich source of grain for any expansionist army, it also provided an enormous tax base that could then be used to sustain any kingdom that could successfully bring it under its sway. The Kabul valley and the mountain passes leading to the Punjab plains were naturally of great strategic importance, as were the Punjab plains for anyone harboring ambitions of reaching the fabulously wealthy cities of Mathura and Kannauj situated in the Yamuna-Ganga Doaba. The large-scale looting and vandalism of idols made of gold and silver (that were inlaid with precious stones) that followed the defeat of such important political, cultural and religious centers lends credence to views that grabbing a share of India's then fabled wealth was indeed an important motive-force for the campaigns of Ghaznavi. 
Chroniclers at the court of Ghazni bemoaned how the "Hindus" were completely uninterested in the ideas and cultural artifacts of kingdoms they saw as alien, and how they were mostly self-absorbed and self-content. It is likely that ambitious scholars in Ghazni who may have sought or coveted the sponsorship of the Hindu courts may have been frustrated or even jealous that they could not establish a foothold in Kabul and Lahore, and may have therefore supported the military campaigns against Punjab. 
It should also be noted that the Central Asian Turkik tribes who had conquered power all along the silk route were greatly dependant on income from trade for their economic survival. It is likely that having had difficulty selling Chinese, Persian or Central Asian wares in Punjab, they may have also had a vested interest in the defeat of the Jaipal dynasty. Since the towns along the silk route were relatively sparsely populated, there was also the constant demand for skilled artisans and slave labor at construction sites. Only the relatively densely populated settlements of the Indian plains could have provided skilled (or unskilled) slave labor in any quantity. (For instance, it is rarely mentioned that the Ghurids were slave-traders, and that the conquest of Punjab opened up a huge supply of slaves from Northern India). While the motives of the orthodox clerics in defending Islamic expansionism are only too evident, it is  more than likely that a compendium of interests may have come together to propel the military advances of Ghazni (and later Ghouri) into Northern India. 
For the court at Ghazni, the pirate-like attacks on India and the conquest of Punjab came as a huge boon, and Ghazni flourished as an important cultural center during Mahmud's reign. However, it cannot be denied that Ghazni's rise must have come at a considerable price. Even as one might argue that the gold and silver invested in temple idols was simply unproductive wealth and its theft ought not be invested with too much negative import, the slaughter (or enslavement) of hundreds of thousands of peasants and artisans is harder to ignore. The persecution of non-Sunnis and the enforcement of Sunni overlordship must also be acknowledged.
Although there are indications  that Hindu society in the 11th century was developing  some conservative and even reactionary trends, it  is difficult to see how the Central Asian conquests could have helped matters. Contrary to the assertion of some historians (that Hindu society was entirely corrupt and fragmented) , Hindu rulers such as Jaipal did manage to garner the assistance of other friendly Rajputs, and even the support of the Shia rulers of Multan and Sindh. However, many of Punjab's masses initially remained aloof from the battles, assuming that their lot was not going to change one way or another. Certainly those that suffered the worst of caste-prejudices had little at stake.
But as it became clear that the defeat of West Punjab was going to lead to the veritable destruction of society and mass enslavement, the masses of Eastern Punjab got wiser, and the resistance to further invasions became much more determined.
As Punjab became the primary supplier of slaves to Central Asia, there was a wave of artisans and intellectuals who felt compelled to flee.For instance, there are plausible theories (on account of similarities in language, beliefs and customs) that suggest that the Roma people reached Europe upon fleeing persecution in Punjab and Sindh.
Al-Beruni, Mahmud's chronicler wrote: "Mahmud utterly ruined the prosperity of the country and performed those wonderful exploits by which the Hindus became like atoms of dust scattered in all directions...their scattered remains cherish, of course, the most inveterate aversion towards all Muslims. This is the reason too why Hindu sciences have retired far away from parts of the country conquered by us and have fled to places, which our hand cannot yet reach, to Kashmir, Benaras and other places." 
The latter quote is especially important, because it suggests that prior to the Turkic conquest of Punjab, (and the imposition of Islamic rule), Hindu society provided scope for the study of science, but for such efforts to continue, scientifically-minded Hindus had to retreat further and further from the lands that were under attack.
With the exception of a small number of Hindus who saw upward mobility after volunteering their services to the armies of Ghaznavi and Ghauri (either as soldiers or as spies), the vast majority were left with no choice but to either convert to Islam or to be relegated to inferior social and political status and higher levels of taxation (if they chose to remain as Hindus). Moreover, even those that chose to convert to Islam were subject to systematic discrimination since the Turkish nobility refused to accept Indian converts to Islam as their equals. India's Turkish invaders thus became like a caste above all castes. Rather than the caste system being undermined by Islamic egalitarianism (as some have attempted to argue), new all-powerful castes of foreign-origin Muslims lorded over all others. The arrival of Islam merely cast a veil over  overt caste-distinctions and prejudice, since by and large, upper-caste Hindu converts to Islam retained old caste loyalties even after conversion. Only in some cases were caste distinctions actually ameliorated (due to the succesful intervention of the Sufis), but this also occurred under the influence of  some of the Vaishanava and Bhakti movements in Hindu India.
(Although over time, inter-marriage and the rise and fall of dynasties led to a certain degree of equalization amongst foreign-origin Muslims and Indian Muslim converts (as also between Hindus and Muslims), it is noteworthy that foreign-born Muslims (typically Ashrafs) retained some degree of aloofness from other Indian Muslims, and were amongst the chief supporters of the Muslim League, and were most instrumental in the formation of Pakistan. It is therefore not surprising that a version of history that suits this segment of the Muslim population has been foisted on all the people of Pakistan.)
In addition, the Ghaznavi and Ghauri invasions may have only served to  de-politicize the Punjabi masses who became more introverted and many may have converted to Islam more out of  expediency than any real conviction.  It should also be noted that as per the notes of chroniclers such as Al-Beruni, Punjabi society had a somewhat liberal and detached attitude towards religion, and Al-Beruni was surprised to find the absence of the sort of  messianic zeal he had observed amongst his Central Asian religious brethren. He also found the degree to which Punjabi men consulted their wives on virtually all important matters unusual - expecting the men to take decisions more unilaterally - perhaps in consultation with other men (as was customary amongst the Central Asian Turks), but not with their spouses. It is therefore likely that these invasions led to significant sociological changes that in particular reduced the space for spiritual and philosophical enquiry and further circumscribed the role of women in society.
It may be worth emphasizing that prior to the Islamic invasions the rules of warfare between warring Kshatriyas were such that civilian populations were not to be violated. There was no sanction for mass slavery or the mass rape of women. However, in the slave-owning and slave-trading culture of the Central Asian invaders, it was routine for civilians to be violated, to be raped and/or enslaved. As a consequence, this must have led to a considerable reduction in the freedom and the rights of women and children, who could no longer travel  freely or risk being seen in public alone and unattended.
Unsurprisingly, Ghazni's rise was itself short-lived and the city was ransacked a decade after Mahmud's death by the  ruler of Ghur (whose clan had a history of trading in slaves). Thus, Ghazni suffered the same fate that had been meted out earlier on cities such as Kannauj and Mathura. By and large, the Turkic Islamic empires in Punjab and Northern India were extremely unstable. It was much easier for the invaders to launch raids against the Hindu kingdoms that adjoined Punjab than successfully govern any territories they won. It is also notable that the fall of Western Punjab led to more organized resistance further East in the Doaba. Jaipal's son Anandapala not only received support from the wealthy, but also from weavers and other artisans. But in the end, the persistence of the invaders prevailed over the armies of Raja Anandapala.
Chronicles from the Sultanate period in Punjab and Delhi point to an era of constant court intrigues, conspiracies, murders of kings and wars of succession. Punjab - which was at the very front lines of the invasions was naturally most vulnerable, and its flat plains offered few geographical features that could have facilitated guerilla-wars against unpopular alien rule. But the Rajputana region, the hills East of Punjab and the Central Plateaus regions were always strongly contested, and were much harder to retain by any invader. Later, Yadav, Sikh and Jat chieftains began to offer militant resistance even in the plains. This to some degree explains the marked difference in the extent of Islamic penetration in the Indian subcontinent. 
In any case, what is apparent is that at least during the earliest centuries of Turkic Islamic conquest, Punjab experienced a phase of considerable political instability, and may have suffered through a period of economic and cultural decline, perhaps, considerable stress and anxiety (if not outright abuse and oppression). At best, some sections of society may have survived by adapting to the demands of the invaders.
By and large, Punjab's cultural revival took place much later, under the influence of indigenous Sufi philosophers and artisans who were instrumental in the creation of a new architectural idiom and had a strong influence in the growth of the crafts industries. Multan was at the very heart of this Sufi-oriented tradition (until the rise of the Mughals, when Lahore gained in prominence).
But even any indirectly positive legacy must be weighed against the onerous and dramatic rise in the export of slaves from Punjab. For although  the subjugation of Punjab may have facilitated the rapid growth of magnificent trading cities and political centers along the silk route (such as Khiva, Samarqand, Bukhara in Central Asia, and Herat and other great cities in what is now Afghanistan),  underlying the medieval glamor and glory of the silk route was  the plunder of  Northern India's agricultural  prosperity, and the significant enslavement of its peasant masses.
It is therefore ironic that the land which may have paid quite a heavy price for the invasions emanating from Ghazni and Ghur should today be ruled by a military elite that enjoins its people to revere these invaders as ideological heroes. And thus persists, the ideological enslavement to an externally-coerced medieval outlook. The all-round progress of  the people of Punjab is held back., even as other nations prosper and develop at a much faster pace.

Islamization and the Arab Conquest of Sindh

Officially sanctioned histories of Sindh in Pakistan routinely describe the invasion and subsequent conquest of Sindh by Mohammad Bin Qasim in 711-13 as an event that liberated the masses of Sindh from Brahminical tyranny and oppressive caste rule, ushering in an era of unprecedented social equality that was facilitated by the introduction of Islam - a faith unparalleled in its egalitarian outlook and commitment to fairness and justice. It is also asserted that the Arab rulers of Sindh promoted education and learning on a large-scale, and that Sindh experienced a cultural renaissance that outperformed the achievements of any previous era in the land of the Indus river.
Since the glorification and preservation of the Islamic faith was supposedly the very foundational basis of Pakistan, it is hardly likely that official textbooks in Pakistan could describe the invasion by the Bin Qasim militias any differently. In a nation where even relatively innocuous violations of the country's blasphemy laws have lead to the death penalty, it not surprising that few Pakistani scholars and historians have taken on the risk of seriously investigating, let alone challenge such claims. Since so little scholarly work is available on this subject, the task of understanding the history of this period in any objective fashion is not easy. Nevertheless, it is possible to ask some reasonable questions and present sufficient circumstantial evidence that belie such official government claims concerning the Bin Qasim victory, and its impact on the people of Sindh.
The claim that Sindh during the 7th century was reeling from the hegemony of Brahminical authority is often accepted as truth simply because it has been made so frequently, and by such a variety of colonial and post-colonial historians and social scientists that few scholars have demanded any concrete evidence that might substantiate such a claim. But as the essay on the History of Social Relations in India illustrates, several 5th-7th C Gupta-period land decrees demonstrate that caste was a relatively flexible category, and that Brahmins did not enjoy social hegemony until the widespread proliferation of the agrahara villages, a practice that started towards the end of the Gupta-period in Bihar, spread very slowly in the rest of India, and took more than a few centuries to crystallize. In the neighboring regions of Punjab, Kutch, Gujarat and Rajasthan, there is little evidence that such agrahara villages ever took shape, and the history of these regions appears to be shaped as much (or more) by Rajputs, Jats, Buddhists and Jains as by Brahmins. Virtually all of Sindh's historians acknowledge that Rajputs and Jats also formed a substantial proportion of the Sindhi population at the time of the Bin Qasim invasion. The presence of Buddhists is also acknowledged, and has been verified by the discovery of Buddhist Stupas and other Buddhist artifacts in the state.
Although at the time of the Bin Qasim invasion, Sindh was ruled by a Brahmin king, just a generation earlier, Sindh had been ruled by Rajput kings who were believed to favor Buddhism. Although it is possible that Sindh's Raja Dahir lacked popularity, to suggest that Brahminical hegemony was established in a matter of just a few decades appears to strain credibility. Since the ascension of a Brahmin king could only have occurred with the tacit support of key Rajputs and other segments in society, at most one could speak of factional differences or factional rivalries amongst the elite that may have contributed to the downfall of Sindh.
(Sindhi historian G.M Syed (jailed in 1964 for his contradictory accounts of Sindh's history) however offers an altogether different interpretation, arguing instead that at the time of the invasions, Raja Dahir’s reign was marked by religious tolerance and liberal mindedness, on account of which people of various religions co-existed peacefully, where Hindus had their temples, the Parsis (Zoroastrians) their fire temples, the Buddhists their Stupas, and Arab Muslims (who had been given permission to settle along the coast) had their mosques. According to him, the primary motive for the Arab invasion of Sindh was revenge against Raja Dahir for providing shelter to Sassanian nobles/generals who had requested asylum in Sindh upon defeat in Persia. It is not inconceivable that the Umayyads feared a Sassanian counter-attack from Indian soil, and wished to preempt any possibility (real or imagined) of a Sindhi-Persian alliance that might thwart Arab expansion. The later migration of Parsis (Zoroastrians) to Gujarat and grant of asylum there would appear to bolster such a contention.)
While caste divisions may have indeed prevented Hindu society from offering united resistance to the Islamic invaders, it does not appear as though the advent of Islam actually liberated the most oppressed Jatis. According to Al-Beruni (b. Khiva, 973AD), those most discriminated in Hindu society were those associated with carrying out "unclean tasks", but it should be noted that in Sindh (and elsewhere in India), there are precisely such oppressed communities that were never converted to Islam, and continued to face discrimination at the hands of both Hindus and Muslims.
(It might also be noted that the 11-12th C Sumra rulers of Sindh were Rajput converts to Islam, as were the 13-14th C Samma rulers. After colonization, castes associated with trade and commerce such as Hindu Banias and Lohanas or their Muslim counterparts such as Memons exercised a powerful hold over cash-poor and indebted artisans and peasants. By and large, conversion to Islam did not end pre-existing caste-loyalties or eliminate differences in social rank. Also see Zarina Bhatty: "Social stratification among Muslims in India" from the book "Caste - its twentieth century avatar" by M N Srinivas, Viking, New Delhi, 1996, pp 249 - 253.)
While noting the similarities between the caste-system of India with ancient Persia, Al-Beruni, (in his descriptions of neighboring Punjab) also wrote of contact and association (even common lodgings) between the four main jatis or varnas in towns and villages, only observing that the antyajas (untouchable castes) formed eight separate guilds, and lived near (but apart from) the towns and villages. Going by his remarks, one could conclude that the antyajas suffered from an inferior status, but the social interaction that he noted between the four main castes suggests that the distance between the Brahmins or Ksahtriyas vis-a-vis the Vaishyas and Shudras was not as significant as is generally portrayed.
Al-Beruni also wrote little to suggest that Brahmins enjoyed exceptional status or power in society, but observed that on theological topics "at the utmost they (referring to the Hindus he had studied and interacted with) fight with words, but they will never stake their soul or body or their property on religious controversy." He also noted that the "Hindus have cultivated numerous branches of science and have boundless literature...". He was particularly impressed by the numerous step-wells he had seen in the country, and wrote: "In this they have attained to a very degree of art, so that our people (the Muslims), when they see them, wonder at them, and are unable to describe them, much less to construct anything like them."
Not only do Al-Beruni's descriptions of Punjab stand somewhat apart from the official characterizations of Hindu society, they raise a troubling paradox for Pakistan's official historians. Had Islam truly been a vehicle for the liberation of Hindu society from the evils of Brahminism (as is repeatedly proclaimed), how was it that three centuries after the unqualified triumph of "Islam" in Sindh, Hindu society continued to survive just next door in Punjab, and the Islamic faith was able to win few converts amongst the majority of the Hindus, and not even amongst the discriminated caste communities? And had Sindh become this great center of learning and culture after its conquest by Bin Qasim, how was it that Al-Beruni (an avowed Muslim) was studying Hindu scientific texts in Punjab, but not "Islamic" scientific texts in Sindh?
In fact, it is decidedly odd that there is virtually no archaeological evidence or surviving monuments from that era that might attest to claims of a great Arab civilization in Sindh. A British historian is supposed to have remarked: "Notwithstanding that their possession was partial and unstable, our native [British] soil teems with their [Roman] buildings, camps, roads, coins, utensils, in a manner to show completely they were master-spirits of that remote province [Britain]. But with regard to the Arab dominion in Sind, it is impossible for the traveler to wander through that land, without being struck with the absence of all record of their occupation."
This is all the more puzzling when one considers the very rich and impressive record of temples, step-wells, urban gateways, colleges and monasteries (built between the 8th and the 13th centuries) that have survived in the neighboring states of Rajasthan and Gujarat - states that successfully fended off the Arab invasions.
{In the 11th C, the Soomras, (who according to Sindhi historian, G.M. Syed were Rajputs and only nominally Muslim) took over the reins of power in Sindh, and ruled for three centuries. By then, Sindh had been freed from paying tribute to the Arab Khalifate, and monuments commissioned by the Soomras and the later Sammas have survived, though the greatest evidence of monumental building activity in Sindh emerges from after the 16th C.}
Although there are references to trade and agricultural productivity in post-conquest Sindh in the Arab records of the 9th and 10th centuries, these are not especially noteworthy, since the Arab lands were always poorer in agricultural terms, and positive references to Sindh are also to be found in the writings of Greek historians (who describe it as the most flourishing of all that the Greeks had seen), and a few centuries later, Sindh was mentioned as a rich country by Roman historians (with specific references to Patala in lower Sindh as an emporium of trade). What is more surprising is that there seems to have been an equally (or more) vigorous trade between the ports of Gujarat and the Arab ports as with Sindh after its Arab conquest.
A resolution to this apparent mystery may be found in the description of the conquest of Sindh in a Persian translation of the Chach-na'ma or Tari'kh-I Hind wa Sind, by Muhammad 'Ali bin Hamid bin Abu Bakr (Kufi, early 13th C) which reveals quite a different story. Contradicting any theory representing the arrival of Islam in the Indian subcontinent as a great social revolution, the Chach-na'ma reveals a pirate-like conquest that wreaked havoc on the local populations, transferring a considerable volume of plundered wealth such as gold, silver and jewelry, and also slaves, as tribute to the Umayyad governers. Bin Qasim and his military cohorts also profited greatly from the conquest, enriching themselves at the expense of the local population. Another history of the period, the Futuhu-l Bulda'n by Ahmad bin Yahya, bin Jabir, (892-3 AD) describes how some of the victories were achieved by the destruction (or salinization) of vital aqueducts that starved the populations of drinking water, leading to their surrender. Both documents describe the slaying of able-bodied soldiers and other townsmen, and the taking of women and children as slaves in large numbers.
With the looting of its savings of gold and silver and other assets, and the annual demands for tribute (estimated at a million dirhams annually) it is not surprising that Sindh was culturally and economically eclipsed by Gujarat and Rajasthan - its eastern neighbors who escaped such devastation. It is also interesting that references to Islam (by the victors) are made more as after-thoughts, and only after military triumphs, when the looting of wealth and taking of slaves is justified in the name of God, Islam, or the Holy Prophet. The conversion of temples to mosques also appear more as symbols of a successful military and political assault than as a religious victory per se.
What is remarkable in both these documents are some of the references to mass conversions. Conversion to Islam is offered as an option to defeated populations - and it is assumed that conversion to Islam would be taken as a token of surrender, as a willingness to pay tribute to the new authorities, and as a sign that the political suzerainty of the victors would not be challenged. Although, not everyone was required to convert, the greatest pressure to convert was applied on those considered most dangerous, and most able to resist the conquerors - i.e. on Rajputs and Jats, and on men, rather than women. The conversion of others simply followed.
This was apparently quite common during the period of Arab expansion, and led to the widely held belief that "the common people follow the religion of the ruler" - something emphasized repeatedly by Arab historian Ibn Khaldun (b, Tunis, 1332) in his "Muqaddimah - an Introduction to History". Ibn Khaldun's writings are particularly interesting because as an avowed Muslim, and defender of the sayings of the Prophet and the Quran, his descriptions of the Arab royal houses, and their origins as the Islamicized Bedouin tribes of the Arab peninsula carry a credibility and acceptance other historians may not receive. But his status as one of the pre-eminent historians of the Arab world has more to do with his questioning of exaggerated and wildly improbable claims made by historians like al-Masudi and al-Waqidi, and his intuitive awareness of what propelled royal power and prestige, and how dynasties rose and fell in the Arab world. Also of interest is the element of rationality that imbues some of his writings. Unlike the ideologues of the two-nation theory and zealous advocates of Islamic Jehad in Pakistan today, (who attempt to portray Islam as a radical and egalitarian force), Ibn Khaldun's analysis is far more revealing of Islam's role in cementing state power, in building and preserving larger and more stable empires.
Although Ibn Khaldun quotes frequently from the Quran, and there are repeated references to "such is God's Will" or "such are God's Ways", he shows little moral outrage or concern for equity or social justice when he writes about the excesses of royal conquests or royal authority. Speaking of how "the common people follow the religion of the ruler" he writes: "The ruler dominates those under him. His subjects imitate him because they see perfection in him, exactly as children imitate their parents, or students their teachers. God is wise and all-knowing". Although one may question this statement as an accurate description of why the masses accepted Islam, it does indicate that the Islamic-identified ruling class in the Arab world did not ascribe any independent agency to the masses in choosing or practicing their religion.
In the views of Ibn Khaldun dynasties arise from successfully marshalling "group feeling" which he believed originated from respect of blood ties or something akin to that. Because of the difficult conditions the Bedouins were exposed to in the desert, he saw the Bedouins as most capable of developing and harnessing "group feelings". He also noted the fearless manner in which they fought and subdued others - seeing in their "savagery", the seeds of royal power. However, he also saw the Bedouins as wild and anarchic - as all too capable of plundering the possessions of others, and destroying the civilizations of those whom they conquered, citing specifically the ruination of the civilizations of Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and the Sudan after Bedouin conquests. He thus argued that for the Bedouins to develop royal leadership, they needed the strong influence of a religion such as Islam, which he saw as being crucial to the initial success of the Arabs. It was the cohesive force of Islam that enabled the Arabs to combine strong "group feelings" with the political leadership that was necessary to win and sustain stable royal dynasties. He attributed their subsequent decline to their neglect of religion, and of losing their "group feeling" and leadership skills in the course of acquiring wealth and urban comforts.
In developing these elaborate theories on the rise and fall of dynastic rule, he acknowledges that a nation that is defeated, and comes under the rule of another quickly perishes citing the case of Persia after its Arab conquests. However, he saw nothing ethically or morally wrong in the subjugation of one nation by another. For instance, he dismissed any moral objections that might have arisen over the plight of the conquered nations of Sub-Saharan Africa, justifying their state of servitude to the Arab rulers as a consequence of their "weakness" and "lack of ability".
While Ibn Khaldun did not see the Arab conquests or the subsequent Islamization of the local populations as bringing any benefit to those who were thus defeated or subjugated, neither did he see in this any contradiction with Islamic ethics. What is implicit in his writings is that Islam was more the instrument for developing tribal leadership, and the means of cementing political control over those who shared in the "group feelings" of the ruling clans, or by extension, a means of controlling those that did not necessarily share in the "group feelings" of the ruling elites. Statements attributing a sense of "fairness" or "justice" to Islam appear more as rehetoric and as gratuitious justifications of the Arab conquests.
Thus although Ibn Khaldun makes no specific statements concerning the conquest of Sindh, his frank assessment of what happened to the civilizations of other territories that came under Bedouin attack or Arab control fits in quite well with what is described in the Chach-na'ma and the Futuhu-l Bulda'n. It is thus possible to infer from his writings that the Arab invasion and conquest of Sindh was part of a historic pattern and political trend that extended from Syria to Sindh, drowning each of the older civilizations as the Arab empires aggressively expanded their reach and control. This view of history would bring a new dimension to the discussion of what contributed to Arab successes, attributing the success to strong "group feeling" and military daring (effectively channelized by leadership derived from a common faith) - something that the materially more advanced, but sedentary urbanized civilizations could not resist.
What was probably common to all the defeated civilizations was that there were no strong bonds of communal loyalty that bound the populations. Socially fragmented - either due to religious tolerance and diversity, or due to caste/class divisions resulting from the growing specialization and differentiation of labour, (or both), it is possible that these civilizations were also riven by factional rivalries that further weakened their defences. Since these invasions swept aside Hindu, Buddhist, Manichean and Zoroastrian societies alike, this more general view of history would thus question the merit of postulations that place Brahminical hegemony or ossification of caste as unique or even primary factors in the equation.
(What is also plausible, and this is a subject that merits further investigation (see note below) is that with the decline of Buddhist rationalism, important sections of society had come to accept the role of Brahmins in providing astrological charts (janampatris), and in guiding personal and public rituals (such as hawans, mass aaratis and jagarans) that were leading society in an idealistic and impractical direction. This may have made the task of the invaders much easier. But it is important to note that the advent of Islam did not actually move society in a more rational and scientific direction. Arab rulers took great interest in Indian astrological theories themselves, and Islam developed its own body of spirit-defeating daily rituals that were in the long run more debilitating than the periodic rituals that may have become commonplace in Hindu society at that time.)
Although Ibn Khaldun's writings stress the role of Islam in the Arab successes, it is not possible to conclude from his writings (as some Islamist scholars have attempted) to claim the universality and superiority of Islam, and speak of its "natural tendency" towards raising the cultural levels of societies that adopted the faith. That Islam was more a political tool (than an inherently more advanced scientific, philosophical or cultural system) is borne out by how the Umayyads sought cultural inspiration from the very civilization they had sought to supplant and replace. This was even more the case with the Abbasids who succeeded the Umayyads. Both invited scholars (and those brought as slaves), were encouraged (or coerced) to translate scientific and philosophical texts from a variety of ancient and contemporary sources including Egyptian, Greek, Syriac, Babylonian and Indian.
It is especially important to note that there was a certain degree of separation of church and state during the reign of the Abbasids who were renowned patrons of art and scientific learning. This separation of church and state facilitated scientific investigation in Basra and Baghdad, and allowed the scholars in these courts to seek knowledge from a variety of sources.
According to Syed Sulaiman Nadvi, author of the Arab-o-Hind ke Tallukat, (and several other historians), mathematicians and philosophers from Sindh made outstanding contributions to the promotion of learning amongst the Arabs. Several physicians were called from Sindh for the treatment of the Caliphs among whom were Ganga and Manka who treated Haroon-al-Rashid. Another Sindhi doctor who made a mark was a newly converted Muslim, Saleh bin Bhahla (Bhalla). Sindhis such as Abul Ata Sindhi, Haroon bin Abdulla Multani, Abu Mohammad Mansuri (from Mansura), Mansoor Hindi, Musa bin Yakub, Saqafi, Abu Zila Sindhi and Kashajam-bin-Sindhi-bin-Shahak achieved eminence as Arabic poets and writers. Sindhi Pandits (scholars) and Veds (physicians) in Baghdad translated numerous texts from Sanskrit on mathematics, astronomy, medicine, literature and ethics into Arabic.
One must also disinguish between the role of the Quranic absolutists and the Sufi liberals, for it was the latter who made the most significant and enduring contributions to the art and culture of the nations that had come to accept Islam. As long as the Sufis were tolerated, there was a path towards progress, and Arab society was able to absorb positive elements from other cultures.
Several Arab scholars relied on Indian scientific texts in their own scholarly translations or adaptations. Noted scholars Al-Fazari (8th C) and his son Muhammad, and Ya'qub ibn Tariq are associated with translations of Sanskrit astronomical texts (Siddhanthas). Al-Kindi (b. Basra, early 9th C) wrote four mathematical texts describing the use of Indian numerals. Al-Khwarizmi (b. Khiva, d. 850) is credited with synthesizing the knowledge of the Greeks and the Hindus in mathematics, astronomy and geography during the reign of the Caliph, al-Ma'mun, (813 to 833). Others translated Indian writings on the scientific method, Chanakya's Arthashastra, the Mahabharatha, and the Panchatantra, which became popularized as Kahlila and Dimna. Widely translated into both Persian and Arabic, it was also reproduced in illustrated versions during the reign of the Abbasids.
Sindhi accountants were also popular and according to Jahez (d. 874 AD) all the 'Sarrafs' (money-changers) in Iraq were Sindhis. Sindh was also a major exporter of agricultural produce and cash crops, as well as a variety of leather goods - including colored and soft leather. The leather shoes of Mansura were particularly renowned. (cited in the Muruj-uz-Zahab, and by Imam Hanbal). Thus, Sindh had a profound influence on Arab science, culture and economic life.
But after forced Islamization, the progress of science in Sindh slowed, and the attention of Arab, Persian and Central Asian scholars turned to Punjab, Gujarat and other centres of learning in India. Hence, the claim that the introduction of Islam under the aegis of Arab invaders such as Bin Qasim was an event that heralded a radical and progressive new era of cultural growth and material prosperity for the people of Sindh, is a largely unproven claim, and in fact, almost untenable when the mass of contrary evidence (both concrete, and circumstantial) is taken into account. That it liberated the people of Sindh from unspeakable horrors is another speculation, driven more by political needs and Islamic chauvinism than by any clear and irrefutable historical evidence.
For the most part, the official histories of Sindh are sustainable only as illusions and myths. A deeply troubling and unstated implication behind such one-sided rhetoric is that the people of Sindh were impotent in fighting off local tyrants themselves, and needed the assistance of external agents to "liberate" them. In addition, there is the underlying assumption that the indigenous people of Sindh were incapable of producing anything of civilizational value on their own, and that the cultural and philosophical systems produced internally were inadequate, and needed to be replaced by those of outsiders. Not only can such assertions be damaging to a nation's self-esteem, these are precisely the sort of ideas that sustained colonial rule.
But since genuine decolonization was hardly on the minds of Pakistan's creators, such notions have gone largely unchallenged. Instead, the logic of the two-nation theory and partition has demanded the propagation of accentuated polemics - howsoever improbable, and howsoever damaging to the psyche of the Pakistani people themselves. Although it is unlikely that the history of Sindh will ever be presented in a truthful and accurate manner by the present ruling elites of Pakistan, ordinary Sindhis may well ask that if the introduction of Islam in Sindh were truly beneficial for the ordinary masses, (supposedly ushering in an era of expanded access to education and learning), how is it that the rural masses of Sindh rank as amongst the most illiterate and most oppressed in the world today? Isn't it ironic how the average literacy in neighboring Rajasthan (one of India's less developed states, with a primarily Hindu population) exceeds 61%, far ahead of Pakistan's currently projected literacy of 45% {Of course, the comparison with India's more industrialized state of Gujarat or agriculturally prosperous Punjab (both with 70% literacy) would make things look still worse.}
Today, Sindh, which was home to one of the world's earliest settled civilizations - i.e. the civilization of Harappa and Mohenjodaro is in a state of cultural and economic crisis - heavily dependant financially on repatriations from the Gulf oil kingdoms, struggling under the weight of a colonial past, and dictatorial present. Internecine religious wars bleed the state constantly, even as it suffers internal discrimination at the hands of the Punjabi military elite. Reclaiming its true history could be the first step it takes towards liberating itself not only from the shackles of its colonial past, but also from the false glorification of invasions and conquests that drained it of its wealth and brought it few tangible returns in exchange.
A more objective and dispassionate examination of the historical record may reveal that rather than Sindh being "liberated" and "civilized" by the Arab invaders, it was in fact, the other way around. Sindh helped educate and civilize the new Arab kingdoms, who in turn helped carry the knowledge of India to Europe. Instead of seeing its pre-Islamic history with contempt or disdain, Sindh (and the rest of present day Pakistan) might do better by acknowledging the positive aspects of the intellectual and cultural traditions that had developed prior to Islamic rule and played such an important role in shaping the civilizations of the Arab and Western worlds.

Notes:

As mentioned earlier, the negative influence of astrology and a misguided reliance on rituals in Hindu society may have impeded the formulation of successful strategies for defence against invaders (who although lacking any sense of honour and ethics in the battlefield), appear to have been far more realistic and persistent in their approach to war-making. To what extent factors such as these could have been germane to the outcome in Sindh needs further investigation. But evidence from later battles is quite intriguing.

For instance, there is evidence from Gujarat about local populations performing mass aaratis and hawans in the hope of staving off attack rather than taking concrete material steps to defend against them. There is also evidence that Prithviraj Chauhan's armies lost their advantage in the battlefield on numerous occasions because they refused to press forward when they feared that the constellation of the stars wasn't quite right.

But apart from such lapses, it also appears that the unhesitant and unsentimental military tactics described in the Mahabharatha (which had already been translated into Arabic and Persian by then) were emulated more by the invaders than the defenders, who through centuries of civilization had been socaliazed to conduct war in a more cautious, chivalrous and honorable manner. Whereas Indian rulers adhered to a more respectable code of war conduct, the invaders were unencumbered by any moral or ethical constraints.

Nevertheless, the Rajputs of Rajasthan and Bundelkhand, and the rulers of Utkal/ Kalinga (Orissa) either successfully fought off Islamic invaders, or else managed to regroup to fight another day. And it is perhaps no coincidence that in the Orissa region, the influence of astrology and Vedic rituals on society remained relatively insignificant until about the late 15th C, and in Rajasthan and Bundlekhand, the role of the Brhamins was never quite as prominent. Although an interest in astrology had propelled many Indians towards making important discoveries in mathematics and astronomy, its overpowering influence in the battlefield was clearly disastrous.

Other analysts have also ascribed the successes of the invaders at least partially to superior weapons and more advanced war technology. Some historians have cited the unreliability of Indian elephants in the battlefield as a factor that led to sudden and unexpected military losses in key battles, but there are other more likely accounts that suggest that elephants were poisoned, and that the invading forces were more successful in using subterfuges and terror tactics to intimidate the defending populations. It also appears that Indian defences were often overly dependant on the bravery and survival of the main leader in battle. Once the main leader was killed or captured, the rest of the army simply lost its morale and collapsed. There are also stories of some kings from the plains (in present day UP and Bihar) who fled like cowards after minor military setbacks or defeats.